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NATIONALISM, GEOPOLITICS, AND NAVAL
EXPANSIONISM
From the Nineteenth Century to the Rise of China
Robert S. Ross

T

here is perhaps no more momentous great-power strategic decision, short
of launching a war, than to develop a power-projection, war-winning maritime capability—thereby challenging, and risking heightened conflict with, an
established maritime power. The likely costs of such a decision should caution
the rising power against pursuing expansive naval ambitions. Such costs include
the long-term costs of building the requisite number of surface ships that possess
the advanced engineering and military capabilities necessary to enable maritime
security; of diverting resources from other pressing territorial-defense and domestic demands; of suffering the predictable societal, economic, and security
impacts of heightened and protracted great-power conflict; of preparing for the
possibility of great-power war; and ultimately, perhaps, of losing a great-power
war.
Despite these generalized risks entailed in pursuing destabilizing maritime
capabilities, and frequently despite particular risks inherent to their insecure
geopolitical circumstances and interior borders, many great powers have pursued extensive great-power maritime capabilities. In the past two hundred years,
France twice challenged British maritime hegemony. The United States initiated
its effort to develop global maritime capabilities in the early twentieth century.
Germany challenged British maritime security in the early twentieth century.
Russia frequently sought great-maritime-power capabilities, including in the
1850s, in the 1890s and the early twenty-first century, and in the late 1970s and
’80s. Japan simultaneously sought maritime hegemony in the western Pacific
Ocean and continental hegemony on the East Asian mainland in the 1930s. In
the twenty-first century, China has launched an extensive buildup of its navy to
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secure great-power maritime capabilities and to challenge U.S. maritime dominance in East Asia.
Great-power development of destabilizing maritime capabilities frequently
has reflected the nationalist aspirations for great-power status associated with
the possession of large capital ships and a reputation for maritime dominance.
Great-power nationalist aspirations may reflect the personal ambitions of autocratic leaders, the pressures on unstable autocratic regimes to use nationalism to
enhance domestic legitimacy, the popular aspirations of voters in a democratic
state for international prestige, or a combination thereof. But whatever its particular sources, naval nationalism can have the effect of encouraging expansionist
maritime policies, which can force acquisitions that are not informed by strategic
interests and that ultimately undermine security and contribute to unnecessary
and costly great-power conflict, including war.
This article examines three case studies of nationalist-driven great-power
maritime aspirations from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It addresses
the role of nationalism in driving French maritime ambitions in the 1850s and
1860s, under the leadership of Louis-Napoléon; German maritime ambitions in
the early 1900s, under the leadership of Kaiser Wilhelm II; and U.S. maritime
ambitions in the late 1890s and especially at the beginning of the following
decade, during the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt. In each case, the article
examines the high cost of the revisionist power’s naval expansionism, the relative
importance of its strategic and economic maritime interests to its naval buildup,
and the nonmaterial nationalist sources of its expanding maritime ambitions and
quest for great-power status. It places these countries’ naval nationalism within
the context of their distinct geopolitical circumstances and the challenges to their
continental security interests, explaining both the failures of French and German
naval expansionism and the success of American naval expansionism.
The article’s fourth case study examines China’s recent ambition to acquire
great-power maritime capabilities. Like the other case studies, this one considers
the material and nationalist sources of China’s naval ambitions. It also analyzes
China’s recent naval expansionism in the context of China’s post–Cold War geopolitical circumstances, considers the prospects for China’s success, and explores
the implications for great-power politics and U.S.-Chinese relations.
NATIONALISM, FRENCH NAVAL AMBITIONS IN THE 1850s AND
’60s, AND THE ANGLO-FRENCH NAVAL ARMS RACE
In 1858, following the attempted assassination of Louis-Napoléon by Italian
nationalists based in England and led by Felice Orsini, France began a major
expansion of its maritime defense budget and its naval shipbuilding program.1
The catalyst for the French buildup was British naval power and popular French
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss4/4

Autumn2018Review.indb 12

2

8/6/18 8:49 AM

Ross: Nationalism, Geopolitics, and Naval Expansionism From the Ninetee

ROSS

13

hostility toward the apparent inadequacy of British opposition to anti-French
terrorists in the aftermath of the failed assassination attempt.
The era began with France’s completion in 1858 of the large, modern port
facilities at Cherbourg on the English Channel—directly across from English
shores.2 France also deployed more ships in the English Channel, and with
construction of the Suez Canal it expanded its presence in the Mediterranean
Sea, thus posing a growing challenge to British maritime security. France also
significantly increased its defense spending through the early 1860s to support
its naval buildup; in six years the French naval budget grew by over 30 percent.
Louis-Napoléon also increased French naval personnel, so that the number of
French sailors and marines was nearly twice the British total.3
Along with increased naval spending and naval expansion, France launched a
new stage of naval competition when it preceded Great Britain in the construction of the first ironclad capital ship. In 1858, it ordered construction of six ironclads; it began constructing the first that year and another in 1859; and it commissioned the first, Gloire, in 1860. France thus began a rapid ship-construction
program, and by the end of the decade it had constructed twenty-six ironclads,
representing a challenge to Great Britain in the form of potential maritime supremacy in British coastal waters.4
As French naval power grew, the regime explicitly challenged British security.
In 1860, the French ambassador in London warned that if Great Britain did not
accept French ambitions in Europe, France would destroy the foundations of
British naval power. Napoléon III publicly aspired to turn the Mediterranean Sea
into a “French lake.”5
Louis-Napoléon, Nationalism, and French Naval Ambition
France’s ambitious maritime policy was financially costly and strategically risky.
While the country increased its naval budget, its army budget stagnated and its
continental defense capability languished. At the outset of the naval buildup,
France’s naval ambitions also risked heightened conflict with Great Britain. The
combination of belligerent French diplomacy and the naval buildup created the
1859–60 French “invasion scare” in England. French naval ambitions alarmed
Queen Victoria and Prince Consort Albert. Queen Victoria argued that Great
Britain’s “very existence may be said to depend” on the country’s resolve to maintain its maritime supremacy. The prime minister, Henry J. Temple, Lord Palmerston, was especially alarmed by the French buildup and successfully argued for
funding the rapid fortification of British harbors and dockyards.6
France’s challenge to British maritime supremacy was intrinsically risky, yet
French naval ambitions were not fueled by either relative expanded financial
resources or increased security or economic concerns. Trends in relative British

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018

Autumn2018Review.indb 13

3

8/6/18 8:49 AM

14

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 4, Art. 4

and French economic development in the 1850s did not suggest a financial opportunity for France to outspend Great Britain in a naval arms race. On the
contrary, during the 1850s trends in British and French economic growth significantly reduced French financial competitive ability vis-à-vis Great Britain, and by
1860 British gross domestic product (GDP) was approximately 40 percent greater
than French GDP, so Great Britain was in a much better position to fund an arms
race.7 Moreover, unlike France, because of its territorial security Great Britain
could prioritize funding for the navy within its overall defense budget.
France’s growing naval budget burden also did not represent a strategic response to increased British maritime capabilities. From the end of the Crimean
War through 1859, London maintained a moderate maritime budget and shipbuilding program and the
Louis-Napoléon’s preoccupation with greatstrength of its fleet declined,
power status to the detriment of security
even as France modernized
contributed to a devastating French military
and expanded the size of its
defeat, the demise of his nationalist regime,
fleet. London showed miniand his exile from France.
mal interest in developing
ironclad ships. Moreover, the
bulk of British ships remained in distant waters rather than in the vicinity of
French coastal waters.8 Thus, heightened threat perception did not drive France’s
revisionist maritime acquisitions.
Similarly, concern for economic security did not drive France’s heightened
maritime ambitions. Despite France’s colonial presence in northern Africa and
its recent acquisition of colonies in Indochina, France remained dependent on its
continental economic relationships. In 1858, approximately two-thirds of French
total trade was conducted with four of its immediate neighbors: Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Spain. During the decade prior to the onset of the American Civil
War in 1860, the United States was France’s leading single trade partner, but the
U.S. portion of total French trade declined over the course of the 1850s.9 Thus,
growing global economic interests and the increased importance of protecting
sea-lanes and overseas trade relationships did not drive France’s heightened interest in maritime power and its challenge to British security.
Thus, in general, material interests cannot explain France’s costly pursuit
of maritime ambitions and its challenge to British maritime security. Rather,
France’s naval ambitions reflected a combination of Louis-Napoléon’s personal
commitment to developing French naval power and his use of French naval
power to sustain his domestic political legitimacy, and thereby the stability of his
autocratic regime. The French fleet under Louis-Napoléon was a “prestige fleet.”
In its support for Louis-Napoléon, the French populace sought glory over all else,
and the navy was the “principal instrument of glory.”10
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss4/4
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Louis-Napoléon’s overwhelming election as president in 1848 and his continuing popularity reflected his populist legitimacy among the rural masses as the
French leader. They believed he represented the interests of the people rather
than the aristocracy and would restore the glory of the French empire. He was
the “Napoléon of the people.” His antiaristocratic coup d’état in 1851 and the
restoration of the empire were well received as promasses, populist measures.11
Nonetheless, potential opposition to his regime was a constant concern, and he
depended on the army to maintain domestic stability and suppress potential opposition movements. In this political context, an essential aspect of Napoléon’s
domestic legitimacy derived from his stature as a military leader. On his election
to the presidency in 1848, he put on a military uniform and posed as an imperial
leader, and frequently reviewed the troops with great fanfare. Moreover, popular
support in the 1850s for military adventurism contributed to France’s military
policies and its participation in the Crimean War, its war in Italy, and its Mexican
expedition.12 Napoléon’s “forward foreign policy,” including his support for war
against Russia, reflected his effort to retain his “precarious hold upon the French
people.”13
In the aftermath of Louis-Napoléon’s succession of military successes in the
1850s, French naval nationalism assumed heightened importance as a source of
the regime’s legitimacy. Moreover, following the Orsini bomb plot, French public
opinion turned against London. Orsini’s bomb had been made in England, and
the French public was dissatisfied with British efforts to curtail subsequent antiFrench activities in England.14 In this domestic and international context, despite
Louis-Napoléon’s commitment to Anglo-French cooperation, his domestic political interests encouraged him to pursue French international prestige through
the construction of world-class maritime capabilities.
In addition to his domestic political interest in developing expansive naval
power, Louis-Napoléon also possessed a strong personal nationalist interest in
military affairs, and particularly in maritime power and French shipbuilding.
He played an active role in developing day-to-day French naval policy, and he
personally decided that France should commence construction of the world’s
first ironclad ship. Following the French bombardment of Sevastopol during the
Crimean War in 1854 and the substantial damage that return fire inflicted on
French wooden ships, Louis-Napoléon proposed the development of ironclads.
He then actively promoted research into ironclad technologies and ordered and
oversaw the early experiments of the armor-plated ships, leading to the completion of Gloire. He also made detailed recommendations for the dimensions of
particular ships for particular missions. He was thus an active “lobbyist” on
behalf of the French navy and the “prime catalyst” of French maritime innovation. The ironclads were the “Emperor’s own creation,” and he had “inaugurated
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
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a great revolution in naval architecture.”15 His intrinsic fascination with naval
matters made possible the allocation of scarce financial resources away from
the French army for the construction and deployment of ironclads, which fed
France’s ambition to become a major maritime power and challenge British
maritime security.
Geopolitics and the Failure of French Nationalism
Not only did Louis-Napoléon’s leadership of French populist nationalism and his
personal naval ambitions fail to promote greater French maritime security and
French great-power status, but rather they contributed to a major weakening of
French security. In 1858, in response to France’s completion of its naval base at
Cherbourg and the continuance of its ambitious shipbuilding program, Great
Britain fortified its coastal regions and began deployment of a Channel Fleet—an
unusual policy in peacetime. Thousands of British volunteer riflemen went to the
shore to defend Great Britain’s coast from the French navy.16
Then, when French construction of the first ironclads threatened to make
British Royal Navy ships obsolete, Great Britain in 1859 began construction
of its own ironclads, launching HMS Warrior in December. Between October
1860 and August 1861, Great Britain increased its planned construction of ironclads from four to fifteen ships. In response to France’s numerical superiority
in ironclads, Britain abandoned its ongoing construction of wooden, screwpropulsion liners in favor of an all-ironclad fleet. Moreover, Great Britain’s ironclads were superior to France’s ironclads, in that they had iron hulls, in contrast
to the wooden hulls of the French ironclads. In addition, British ironclads were
over 50 percent larger than French ironclads. Trends in numerical superiority
also favored Great Britain.17
By the early 1860s, England’s superior financial resources and industrial
strength had dashed any French hope that France might take a permanent lead
over Great Britain in warship construction. By the mid-1860s, France had no
choice but to acquiesce to enduring British maritime superiority, and both sides
returned to their pre–arms race levels of defense spending, in keeping with a
status quo ante maritime balance of power.18
But the greatest impact of Louis-Napoléon’s personal preoccupation with
maritime affairs and France’s popular nationalist naval aspirations was the effect on French continental security. Despite Louis-Napoléon’s dependence on
the army for his political base, domestic prestige, and maintenance of domestic
stability, the army was the weakest of the French armed services. The service was
poorly administered and Napoléon neglected to use his authority to modernize
the ground forces and impose needed reforms on recruitment and training.19
Thus, in the 1870–71 Franco-Prussian War, the French army performed poorly,
failing to provide even modest resistance to the Prussian invasion.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss4/4
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Meanwhile, during the war the navy was mostly irrelevant, as the decisive battles were fought on land, not at sea. But equally revealing was the French navy’s
poor wartime performance, despite its numerical superiority over the Prussian
navy. By the time the navy mobilized for war, the decisive land battles were over
and the outcome of the war had been decided. Napoléon’s focus on the development of a large maritime fleet to enhance French great-power prestige did not
include development of the intelligence and training required to deploy the fleet
quickly and effectively.20
French resources and Louis-Napoléon’s military interests would have served
France better if they had focused on continental security rather than French
maritime grandeur, and if France had maintained a low-cost yet effective guerre
de course capability that could protect French trading interests. France pursued
this strategy in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War when it developed
its “asymmetric” Jeune École maritime policy.21 Ultimately, however, LouisNapoléon’s preoccupation with great-power status to the detriment of security
contributed to a devastating French military defeat, the demise of his nationalist
regime, and his exile from France.
NATIONALISM, GERMAN NAVAL AMBITIONS, AND THE
PRE–WORLD WAR I ANGLO-GERMAN NAVAL ARMS RACE
Beginning in 1898, Germany launched a major naval shipbuilding effort that
imposed a significant financial burden on the country’s finances and provoked
a dangerous arms race with Great Britain. In 1898, Germany’s First Naval Law
funded the construction over six years of nineteen battleships and an additional
fifty ships. Two years later, the Second Naval Law nearly doubled the scope of
this plan, providing unlimited funding for construction of thirty-eight battleships and a total of ninety-six ships. Between 1900 and 1905, Germany laid down
twelve battleships.
When Great Britain responded to Germany’s naval buildup with the construction of the first Dreadnought-class battleship in 1905, thus neutralizing Germany’s superior matériel, Germany countered with its own dreadnought program,
determined to outrace Britain and challenge its maritime dominance. The 1906
German Novelle (supplemental bill) allocated funding for two dreadnoughts and
increased naval spending by 35 percent.
But British efforts to sustain the naval arms race led to ever-further expansion of Germany’s shipbuilding plans and to greater German naval expenditures.
Between 1905 and 1914, the German naval budget increased by 102 percent and
absorbed an ever-larger share of the total defense budget. Between 1901 and
1909, the German naval budget nearly equaled the entire German budget deficit,
and it continued to grow.22
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Kaiser Wilhelm, Nationalism, and German Naval Ambition
Germany’s naval ambitions were strategically risky. They provoked a naval arms
race with Britain and risked a British preventive attack on the nascent German
fleet, a “Copenhagen.” British leaders, including Admiral of the Fleet Sir John A.
Fisher and Civil Lord of the Admiralty Arthur Lee, advocated such an attack, and
German leaders, including State Secretary of the Imperial Naval Office Admiral
Alfred von Tirpitz, were acutely aware of the risk of a British preventive attack
before Germany could achieve a deterrent capability, during the “danger zone”
of its naval buildup.23 Equally important, Germany’s naval ambitions threatened
the German ground force’s capability and German continental security. As tension mounted on the continent and the likelihood of war increased, budget
competition from the navy increasingly constrained the German army’s access
to resources. From 1904 to 1912, while the naval budget climbed 137 percent, the
army budget grew 47 percent. Despite Germany’s precarious two-front territorial
defense dilemma, from 1889 to 1911 the relative size of the naval budget grew
from 20 percent to nearly 55 percent of the army budget, so Germany essentially
was allocating equal financing to the navy and each of the land fronts.24
Neither expanded relative financial resources nor increased security or economic interests can explain Germany’s ambitious and risky naval ambitions. Unlike France in the 1850s and ’60s, Germany experienced considerable industrial
development in the 1880s and ’90s. From 1880 to 1900, the German GDP grew a
remarkable 44 percent; during this same period, the British GDP grew less than
30 percent. But because of Great Britain’s prior significant economic lead over
Germany, Germany’s more rapid economic development did not enable it to
diminish significantly Britain’s financial advantage; in 1900, the British economy
remained nearly one-third larger than the German economy. Overall, British
global industrial domination diminished in the last decades of the nineteenth
century, but Germany’s industrial development had not yet yielded it the financial parity with Great Britain that could foster the confidence necessary to challenge British maritime dominance. On the contrary, rather than benefiting from
German economic growth, Germany’s increased naval budget was a major source
of Germany’s budget deficit.25 Moreover, Germany should have been cautioned
further by the British ability to prioritize its naval budget over its army budget,
unlike Germany.
Germany’s ready dismissal of its economic constraints did not reflect a heightened British maritime threat to German security. During the 1880s and early ’90s,
the British navy became increasingly overextended as its colonial commitments
came under challenge, not only in distant waters of the Western Hemisphere and
East Asia, but also in European waters, with the rise of the French and Russian
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navies and the prospect of Franco-Russian cooperation. The latter development
challenged British maritime security in the Mediterranean Sea and compelled
Great Britain to budget so as to maintain its two-power standard. Moreover,
worldwide interest in maritime power had stimulated ship production among all
the great powers. Whereas in 1893 British battleships nearly equaled in number
the combined total of all the other great powers’ battleships, in 1897 its advantage
had disappeared; it now possessed approximately two-thirds of the total of the
other great powers’ battleships. In this transformed strategic environment, Great
Britain reduced its strategic
Kaiser Wilhelm’s pursuit of his personal naval commitments in the Caribbean Sea and in Northeast
ambitions and his political manipulation of
Asia and redeployed much
popular German naval nationalism not only
of its fleet to the Mediterfailed to promote German maritime security
ranean.26 Thus, in the 1890s,
. . . but contributed to a major weakening of
British maritime capabilities
German continental security.
and deployments did not pose
a growing threat to German maritime security that might explain Germany’s
insistence on incurring the financial and strategic burdens of unrestrained naval
expansion and an Anglo-German arms race.
Germany’s global colonial and economic interests expanded in the 1890s and
the early twentieth century, but they were not a compelling driver of naval expansion either. Granted, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck’s interest in colonial expansion and Germany’s acquisitions in Africa and the Pacific Ocean in the 1880s and
’90s created a German motivation to protect its colonial possessions and its trade
with its new colonies; moreover, from 1899 to 1910, as Germany required evergreater exports to support its growing industrial sector, total German foreign
trade increased by nearly 80 percent, creating in parallel a greater German interest in maritime security.27 Nonetheless, German colonies made only a secondary
contribution to German economic prosperity. As late as 1895, over 60 percent
of Germany’s trade was with its European neighbors. The overwhelming share
of Germany’s remaining trade, and its most important overseas trade, was conducted with the United States. German trade with its colonies was insignificant.28
Thus, for Germany, economic security priorities lay in continental security.
Thus, in the mid-1890s Chancellor Leo von Caprivi argued that Germany
should not seek maritime security through development of a major oceangoing
fleet. In particular, he argued that Germany lacked the maritime potential to
guarantee its transatlantic trade with the United States. Because Germany’s continental neighbors were its most important trading partners and its colonies were
inconsequential to German economic security, Caprivi believed that Germany
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should concentrate its defense resources on its ground forces to enable it to dominate the continent, and that it should develop only a limited counterblockade
capability to ensure continued access to overseas trade.29 But Caprivi’s prudent
foreign policy preferences failed to gain the kaiser’s support, and advocates of
naval expansion soon dominated the development of German maritime policy.
As in the discussion of the sources of French maritime policy from 1858
through the 1860s under Louis-Napoléon, German material interests cannot explain Germany’s costly maritime ambitions in the 1890s and early twentieth century and its challenge to British maritime security. Rather, similarly to France’s
ambitions under Louis-Napoléon, Germany’s revisionist naval ambitions and
its maritime policies reflected the destructive combination of Kaiser Wilhelm’s
personal nationalist commitment to developing a global naval capability that
would challenge British maritime dominance and the growing dependence of the
regime on nationalism for domestic legitimacy.
Kaiser Wilhelm’s commitment to building a world-class German navy, regardless of the strategic and financial impediments, reflected his personal obsession
with naval power and his association of naval power with great-power status and
Germany’s destiny. He considered the head of state to be the “officer of the watch
of the ship of state” and identified his historic mission as the development of a
German navy with stature and capabilities similar to those of the German army.
He personally telegraphed shipbuilding orders to the naval yards. He bestowed on
himself the title of grand admiral of the Imperial German Navy, and he enjoyed
his status as admiral of the Russian navy; admiral of the royal navies of Great Britain, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark; and honorary admiral of the Greek navy. He
possessed a personal flotilla of naval ships that he used for his summer voyages.
From the earliest days of his regime he wore his naval uniform and saw to it that
he was the only member of the German aristocracy to wear an executive naval
officer’s uniform. He also dressed his sons in naval uniforms. As Admiral Tirpitz
later reported, Wilhelm regarded the German navy as his “mechanical toy.”30
Wilhelm associated his personal attachment to naval power with the necessary emergence of Germany as the preeminent world power. When he spoke of
Germany achieving its “place in the sun” he meant that Germany must possess
the world’s most powerful navy. In August 1911, when Germany’s arms race with
Great Britain was at its height, he declared that Germany must strengthen its
navy “so that we can be sure that nobody will dispute with us our place in the sun
which belongs to us!” He insisted that in distant oceans of the globe “no important decision should be taken without Germany and the German Kaiser.” He believed that “without being a world power one was nothing but a poor appearance.”
When he encountered among his advisers opposition to his plans to increase the
naval budget, he exclaimed, “I will not allow England to tell me what to do.”31
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss4/4
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But Germany’s revisionist naval ambitions, its challenge to British maritime
security, and its initiation of the arms race reflected more than Kaiser Wilhelm’s
personal preoccupation with maritime power and his commitment to German
great-power status and nationalist aspirations. Germany under Wilhelm was
experiencing intensifying societal pressures for political reform of its autocratic
monarchy. In these circumstances, rather than yield to popular demands for
liberalization, Wilhelm and his conservative advisers developed domestic and
foreign policies that would unify the German people behind Wilhelm and his
autocratic leadership and consolidate his monarchy.32 For the German autocracy,
the navy was the most powerful source of German nationalist unity, so appeals
to German naval power served the interests of the German regime as well as
Wilhelm’s personal ambitions, just as naval expansionism had served LouisNapoléon’s interest in bolstering regime legitimacy.
In the aftermath of German unification, many of Germany’s institutions,
including the army, railways, and postal service, were not national institutions
but institutions of the German component states. Because a German navy did
not exist prior to unification in 1871, it was created by the new German imperial
government under the direct authority of the kaiser. It was the foremost German
“national institution.” In addition, the navy embodied German middle-class concepts of German culture and international economic superiority. And unlike the
German army, the German navy was not the exclusive realm of the aristocracy;
members of the German bourgeoisie could enlist in the navy and rise through
the ranks to become senior officers. This created widespread popular support for
the German navy.33
Within German society, the Navy League occupied a prominent place. It was
the most popular of all Germany’s various nationalist groups, including the PanGerman League and the Colonial Society, and it established branches throughout
the country. Despite its later start, in 1898, within its first eighteen months, the
Navy League surpassed in total membership all the other nationalist groups combined. The 1900 Second Naval Law stimulated a major increase in Navy League
membership, and by 1907 it had over a million members and associates, making
its membership over eight times larger than that of the Colonial Society.34
Thus, on the one hand, for German naval leaders seeking support for naval
spending, appeals to popular nationalism were effective. Wilhelm understood
this and planned budget politics accordingly, to realize his personal nationalist
ambitions.35 On the other hand, for the German elite seeking to promote its nationalist credentials and foster national unity under the monarchy, the navy was
the perfect nationalist instrument. Thus, as in France under Louis-Napoléon, a
mutually reinforcing relationship existed between Kaiser Wilhelm’s use of popular naval nationalism to serve his personal ambition for Germany’s naval buildup
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
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and its great-power status and the monarchy’s use of naval expansionism to enhance popular support for the regime. Admiral Tirpitz well understood this dual
value of naval nationalism.36
Geopolitics and the Failure of German Nationalism
Kaiser Wilhelm’s pursuit of his personal naval ambitions and his political manipulation of popular German naval nationalism not only failed to promote German maritime security and Germany’s “place in the sun” as a maritime power but
contributed to a major weakening of German continental security.37 Despite Germany’s extensive effort to compete with British naval power, throughout World
War I the German fleet of dreadnoughts was unable to challenge British maritime
supremacy. In the decade prior to World War I, whereas Berlin allocated between
19 and 26 percent of its defense budget to the navy, London allocated 60 percent
of its defense budget to the navy. Ultimately, Wilhelm and Tirpitz had to give up
the naval race to focus Germany’s limited resources on its army and continental
security.38
Great Britain’s victory in the naval race enabled it to impose a close-in blockade
of German maritime trade for the duration of the war. The German fleet ventured
into the North Sea to engage the British fleet just once during the war. Although
Germany fared better than Britain in the 1916 battle of Jutland and could claim
a tactical victory, its greater losses relative to the sizes of the respective fleets deterred Germany from seeking a second engagement. Its fleet remained in harbor
for the remainder of the war, essentially irrelevant to its outcome.39
But the greatest impact of Germany’s nationalist naval ambition was its diversion of scarce economic resources from more strategically important priorities,
and thus its contribution to German military defeat in World War I. In the maritime theater, Wilhelm’s preoccupation with battleships led him to neglect German development of a cost-effective counterblockade submarine fleet that could
have posed a more secure and effective threat against the British fleet.40
In contrast, Adolf Hitler later would understand the value of a less expensive
submarine capability to a continental power’s blockade and counterblockade
capabilities. In September 1939, after the early successes of his U-boats against
British shipping, Hitler switched to construction of a massive U-boat fleet. His
guerre de course strategy drastically reduced British imports, while posing a minimal constraint on Germany’s continental capabilities.41
In the continental theater of World War I, the effect of Wilhelm’s failure to
place sufficient priority on German ground forces was all too clear on the western
front. Diversion of funds equivalent to the cost of even one dreadnought to create
an additional German division might well have enabled an early German victory
against France and altered the campaign on the eastern front against Russia.
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Ultimately, Kaiser Wilhelm’s intense military interests would have served
Germany better if he had focused on developing a more robust continental security force so as to dominate continental Europe, while procuring only a limited
maritime capability, rather than on securing Germany’s “place in the sun” as a
global maritime great power. Wilhelm’s nationalist preoccupation with German
naval preeminence on the high seas contributed to a devastating German military
defeat in World War I and the demise of his monarchy.
NATIONALISM, AMERICAN NAVAL AMBITIONS, AND AMERICA’S
RISE TO WORLD POWER
As was true of the sources of France’s and Germany’s expansive naval ambitions,
the development of expansive U.S. naval ambitions during Theodore Roosevelt’s
presidency in the first decade of the twentieth century did not reflect pressing
security or international economic concerns. Rather, similarly to the French and
German experiences, the U.S. maritime buildup reflected a combination of a
personal nationalist leadership commitment to developing great-power maritime
capabilities and the domestic politics of mass nationalism.
From the end of the Civil War until the passage in 1890 of the so-called Battleship Act, the United States neglected its navy; minimal funding and poor conditions allowed the deterioration of the country’s naval capabilities. The 1890 act
funded construction of three second-class battleships to provide a coastal, guerre
de course naval capability. Then in 1895 Congress authorized funding for the construction of the first two first-class American battleships and the development of
an oceangoing power-projection capability. In the ten years between 1900 and
1910, the U.S. Navy commissioned twenty-five first-class battleships, including
world-class dreadnought-type battleships, as well as many smaller ships. During
the Roosevelt presidency, the Navy commissioned twenty-one battleships. After
fifteen years of funding, in 1910 the U.S. Navy possessed the second-largest number of capital ships in the world.42
This naval buildup was the result of a fundamental reorientation of U.S.
military priorities. The 1890 naval act doubled in one year U.S. spending on the
Navy. During the Roosevelt presidency, the naval budget increased from fifty-five
million dollars to $140 million, a peacetime record for U.S. naval appropriations,
and the tonnage of U.S. capital ships doubled. The Roosevelt administration also
tripled the number of active-duty naval personnel. During this same period,
the U.S. Army budget stagnated and the number of army personnel decreased
by 20 percent. Whereas in 1900 the number of naval personnel was less than 20
percent that of army personnel, in 1910 that proportion was nearly 60 percent.
Increased naval spending during the Roosevelt presidency also changed federal

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018

7210_Ross_LEAD.indd 23

13

8/8/18 11:13 AM

24

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 4, Art. 4

budget priorities. Between 1900 and 1910, the defense budget share of the overall
federal budget increased from 36.6 percent to 45.1 percent.43 Under Roosevelt’s
leadership, the United States began its transition from being a land power to a
naval power.
Theodore Roosevelt, Nationalism, and American Naval Ambition
Neither increased U.S. security concerns nor greater U.S. international economic
interests can explain the costly transformation in U.S. defense policy. In international security affairs, the rapid buildup of U.S. naval forces coincided with
the most secure era in U.S. history. Whereas since 1776 the United States had
been plagued with concerns about European military presence in the Western
Hemisphere and the implications for U.S. territorial security, by the time of the
Roosevelt administration all the European powers had retreated from the Western Hemisphere, withdrawing their naval presences to home waters to deal with
pressing European security concerns. The turning point in U.S. domination of
the western Atlantic was the outcome of the 1895 Anglo-Venezuelan boundary
dispute. Amid a context of German involvement in the Boer conflict in South
Africa, Russian challenges to the British presence in South Asia, and the rise of
the French and Russian navies, the growing threat of war with the United States
compelled Great Britain to concede the merits of the Monroe Doctrine and to
acknowledge the U.S. right to intervene in disputes between Latin American and
European countries. By 1902, Great Britain began a strategic withdrawal from the
Western Hemisphere, conceding U.S. maritime superiority, and it soon welcomed
American expansion, both in its colonial presence in the western Pacific and in
the form of the construction of the Panama Canal.44
Germany posed an equally remote threat to U.S. security. It had no naval
bases in the Western Hemisphere and faced multiple strategic challenges in
continental Europe and a costly maritime competition with Great Britain. By
the beginning of the Roosevelt administration, the combination of military and
political conditions had eliminated a German challenge to U.S. preeminence in
the Western Hemisphere. Both Kaiser Wilhelm and Chancellor Bernhard von
Bülow understood the importance of not antagonizing the United States.45 Thus,
during the 1901 German-Venezuelan dispute, Germany imposed a blockade on
Venezuela but shortly thereafter accepted U.S. mediation of the dispute, thus
concurring with Britain’s earlier acknowledgment of a U.S. right to intervene in
Latin America. The end of the German blockade signaled the demise of German
ambitions in Latin America.46
Nor could Japan threaten the United States. In 1890, the Japanese navy was
weaker than the U.S. Navy, and the Pacific Ocean was a formidable barrier to
Japanese power projection into the Western Hemisphere.47
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Thus, in 1890 the Naval Board recognized that the United States did not face a
threat from any advanced power, including Great Britain. By the early twentieth
century, the United States enjoyed “remarkable security,” and Theodore Roosevelt
understood this. He believed that Great Britain dared not provoke war with the
United States and that it had conceded leadership to the United States in the
Western Hemisphere.48 Any alleged threat from Germany was premised on that
country’s reputed long-term intentions, rather than on its immediate capabilities,
and Roosevelt understood the limits to the German challenge. Given current
trends in European great-power politics, a potential German naval threat did
not require a rapid and expensive buildup of the U.S. Navy. After the U.S. naval
buildup was well under way in 1906, Roosevelt raised the Japanese navy as a potential threat to U.S. security, but he also understood that if this threat developed
it would do so in the distant future. Throughout the Roosevelt presidency, the
absence of a threat to U.S. security frustrated the Navy’s effort to articulate a naval
policy and to justify a naval buildup.49
The United States also did not require a strong oceangoing navy to protect
its interests in foreign trade and international investments. In 1900, less than
10 percent of U.S. GDP came from foreign trade; exports constituted less than 5
percent of GDP.50 During the rise of U.S. naval power, the United States was not
a trading nation. Moreover, during this period the United States possessed only a
small commercial fleet; most U.S. trade was carried on foreign-flagged ships. The
United States gained colonial interests in the western Pacific Ocean following the
war of 1898, but the economic significance of the Philippines, of other U.S. Pacific
possessions, and of overall U.S. trade with East Asia did not require development
of a large navy to protect U.S. economic interests in the western Pacific. President
Roosevelt understood this and did not attempt to justify U.S. maritime expansion
on the basis of American economic interests.51
Similarly to the sources of French maritime policy from 1858 through the
1860s under Louis-Napoléon and of German maritime policy prior to World
War I, national material interests cannot explain expansive U.S. maritime ambitions in the early twentieth century. Rather, American revisionist naval ambitions
reflected dynamics similar to those that gave rise to French and German naval
ambitions. U.S. naval policies reflected President Roosevelt’s personal interest in
naval ships and his nationalist commitment to maritime power, combined with
the impact of American popular nationalism on the development of U.S. defense
policy.
According to Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt shared with Kaiser
Wilhelm a “boyish” fascination with naval ships. As a young boy, Roosevelt
greatly admired his two uncles who had served in the Confederate navy and he
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maintained a long-term relationship with them. In his senior year at Harvard he
began writing a scholarly volume on the naval history of the War of 1812. In his
introduction to the volume, Roosevelt expressed his personal outrage at the poor
condition of the U.S. Navy during the war and the importance of naval power
for national dignity. He wrote that it was “folly” for “the great English-speaking
Republic to possess such an old and inadequate fleet”; America deserved better.
Equally important for explaining his lifelong commitment to U.S. naval power
was the intrinsic excitement Roosevelt associated, from boyhood forward, with
naval warfare, along with the youthful pleasure, natural fun, and lifelong exhilaration he derived from having
America pursued its naval ambitions wearing and directing a large navy.52
Roosevelt’s early interest
the same strategic blinders as had France and
Germany. The United States succeeded where in and enthusiasm for naval
matters contributed to his
other great powers had failed because of the
strong personal attention
fortuitous combination of domestic circumto naval policy during his
stances with a strategic opportunity in greatpresidency. Throughout his
power politics.
presidency he possessed a
nearly “fanatical desire” and persistent determination to develop a large navy.
In contrast to his predecessors, he personally participated with Congress in developing naval appropriations legislation, and he used his considerable political
popularity and political drive to compel congressional support for his policies.
In his first message to Congress, in December 1901—within three months of his
inauguration—Roosevelt made a rousing appeal for a large navy, and soon thereafter he presented specific funding legislation. Throughout his presidency he was
personally involved in such detailed issues as the height of smokestacks and the
proper deployment of ships in battle groups.53
Roosevelt combined his personal interest in ships and navies with a nationalist
impulse to promote American great-power status in world affairs. In this respect,
the rise of the United States as a global naval power depended on the leader’s nationalist impulse, similarly to the dependence on the leaders’ nationalist impulses
of the development of the French navy under Louis-Napoléon and the German
navy under Kaiser Wilhelm.
Roosevelt and his associates, including Alfred Thayer Mahan and Henry
Cabot Lodge, were strong nationalists who were impelled by an overwhelming
pride in the United States. Roosevelt believed that American honor should be
placed above the honor of all other nations. Thus, he considered it “impertinence” for any country to be angry at U.S. actions, was intent on defending U.S.
honor and establishing U.S. resolve, and was determined to resist challenges to
U.S. achievement and maintenance of world-power status. Thus he argued that
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the United States required warships in numbers commensurate with “the greatness of our people” and that a large navy would serve U.S. prestige. When Britain
launched its first dreadnought, Roosevelt was determined that the United States
should possess the world’s largest battleships. He pushed through Congress funding for construction of U.S. dreadnoughts that were larger than those of both
Britain and Germany.54
Roosevelt’s nationalism, including his sense of American greatness, superiority, and infallibility and his inability to conceive of any reason for another nation
to oppose U.S. diplomacy and military policies, was rooted in his conviction of
the superiority of the Anglo-American race and its destiny to lead the world. The
United States stood for peace and civilization, and U.S. expansionism and imperialism, including the development of U.S. maritime power, reflected a national
obligation to crusade for international moral improvement and the spread of
civilization to “backward” peoples. In 1893, Roosevelt wrote that it would be “a
crime against white civilization” for the United States not to annex Hawaii. The
U.S. victory in the war against Spain and its territorial acquisitions in the Far East
should make Americans proud that the United States now could take its place
among the world’s great powers.55
Roosevelt’s nationalist aspirations for U.S. honor and international prestige
were important for the rise of the U.S. Navy. But equally important was the popular American nationalism that reinforced Roosevelt’s personal aspirations and
established the national democratic political conditions for U.S. naval expansionism. In the context of a significant economic recession in the 1890s and the final
fulfillment of Manifest Destiny from coast to coast and the end of the American
“frontier,” Americans were susceptible to emotional sources of renewed national
pride, including the superiority of American values and the legitimacy of U.S.
global power. American churches joined in the expansionist movement, promoting the “imperialism of righteousness” that would spread to the world American
religious values, thus complementing Roosevelt’s personal “crusade” to spread
Anglo-American civilization.56
These popular societal trends established the underlying foundation for jingoism, America’s particular style of nationalism, and for its effect on both U.S. domestic politics and foreign policy. In this context, forceful U.S. resistance in 1895
to British policy toward Venezuela and Great Britain’s subsequent acceptance of
U.S. intervention in Latin America reflected widespread American nationalism
and support for an expansionist foreign policy and the corresponding political
pressures on U.S. foreign policy making. The outcome of the 1895 Venezuela
crisis also encouraged Americans to press for further military-backed nationalist
successes. These trends continued through the end of the decade, when popular
nationalism was a powerful force leading in 1898 to the annexation of Hawaii
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and the U.S. war against Spain. President William McKinley’s effort to negotiate
with Spain a resolution to the conflict in Cuba increasingly isolated him from
Congress and the American people. Quite apart from peripheral U.S. material
interests in opposing Spain’s Cuba policy, Congress and the voters clamored for
war, and ultimately they pushed the president into a war he did not support.57
The rapid American naval victory over Spain elicited widespread and enthusiastic nationalist pride in the U.S. Navy, and within a year of the war Congress
passed widely popular legislation that funded construction of five battleships
and multiple other ships. The Roosevelt administration’s naval legislative agenda
benefited from the larger American naval nationalism. The Navy League of the
United States was founded in 1902, its membership grew quickly among retired
naval officers and American corporate leaders, and it played a valuable role in
mobilizing support to bring about Roosevelt’s legislative successes.58 Roosevelt
himself frequently campaigned for his naval legislation with populist speeches
laden with nationalist appeals harking to the importance of naval expansion
for America’s world stature. In his first State of the Union address, in December
1901, he declared that for the “honor” of the United States, the “work of upbuilding the navy must be steadily continued” and that Americans “must either build
and maintain an adequate navy or else make up their minds definitely to accept a
secondary position in international affairs.”59 During the 1904 presidential campaign, Roosevelt appealed to popular economic nationalism and benefits for the
American worker to justify his naval policies and U.S. imperialism in East Asia.
As he later acknowledged, his decision in 1907 to send the U.S. Atlantic fleet on
an around-the-world cruise reflected more his ultimately successful effort to
arouse popular nationalist support against congressional opposition to his battleship legislation than his effort to establish global—especially Japanese—respect
for U.S. power.60
Geopolitics and the Rise of the American Navy
It is tempting to explain America’s unique success by the superiority of U.S.
political institutions, or the leadership thereof, or both. Neither factor, however,
can explain American success. American democracy and foreign policy in the
late nineteenth century and early twentieth century experienced popular jingoistic and expansionist impulses that reflected minimal awareness of the relative
resources or national interests of the United States. Similarly, there is minimal
documentation that suggests that Theodore Roosevelt calculated that European
great-power politics or advantageous U.S. economic resources had created a strategic opportunity for the United States to challenge the regional and global strategic orders and develop great-power maritime capabilities. America pursued its
naval ambitions wearing the same strategic blinders as had France and Germany.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss4/4

Autumn2018Review.indb 28

18

8/6/18 8:49 AM

Ross: Nationalism, Geopolitics, and Naval Expansionism From the Ninetee

ROSS

29

The United States succeeded where other great powers had failed because
of the fortuitous combination of domestic circumstances with a strategic opportunity in great-power politics. American popular naval nationalism and
the expansionist impulse emerged after the United States had defeated Mexico,
completed its conquest of the American Indian, and settled the Pacific frontier.
These developments and the intrinsic stability of the U.S.-Canadian border established the enduring territorial security that enabled the United States to fund
safely its strategic transition from being a continental power dependent on its
ground forces for security to being a maritime power seeking global influence.
In contrast, similar efforts by France and Germany jeopardized their territorial
security and contributed to devastating military defeats.
Moreover, Britain’s preoccupation first with the emerging French and Russian
navies and then with German naval ambitions compelled it to acquiesce to U.S.
global naval ambitions and to acknowledge the Caribbean Sea as a U.S. sphere of
influence.61 These developments in British security enabled the United States to
avoid engagement in a costly arms race and the prospect of a “Copenhagen”—the
strategic challenges that plagued the security and naval aspirations of both France
and Germany.
CHINA GOES TO SEA
A combination of nationalist leadership and popular nationalism drove French
naval ambitions under Louis-Napoléon in the 1850s and 1860s, German naval
ambitions under Kaiser Wilhelm in the early twentieth century, and U.S. naval
ambitions during the Theodore Roosevelt presidency in the early twentieth century. In each case, a personal leadership commitment to building naval power
coalesced with popular nationalism to fuel national ambitions for great-power
status, reflected in large capital ships and substantial maritime power. Such nationalism contributed to strategic disaster for France and Germany. For the
United States, however, these same conditions propelled the country to construct,
by 1908, the world’s second-largest navy while strengthening national security,
and to establish the foundations for America’s eventual emergence as the world’s
preeminent maritime power.
In the twenty-first century, China has become the latest land power to go to
sea. After thirty-five years of double-digit annual growth in its GDP and defense
spending and significant technological modernization, China is building a
large and modern naval fleet whose capabilities soon may rival those of the U.S.
Navy in East Asia. The recent pace of China’s shipbuilding program has been
impressive. Since 2000, China has replaced most of its prereform platforms with
“modern” platforms. Whereas only 3 percent of Chinese attack submarines were
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“modern” in 1996, currently 70 percent are. China also has been developing large
numbers of modern surface ships. Serial production of the Houbei and Jingdao
classes has contributed to establishing and maintaining the Chinese maritime
presence throughout the East and South China Seas. China’s development of a
next-generation frigate, the Jiangkai class, will enhance the war-fighting capability of the Chinese navy. Even at reduced rates of GDP growth, China’s shipbuilding program will add significant numbers of modern naval platforms, including
attack submarines, frigates, destroyers, and smaller fast-attack ships armed with
antiship cruise missiles. According to one estimate, assuming that China’s naval
budget over the next fifteen years grows commensurately with its GDP growth,
by then the Chinese navy will possess well over four hundred surface combat
ships and nearly one hundred submarines. All these modern ships will make significant contributions to Chinese naval capabilities in the East and South China
Seas and will contribute to improved Chinese capabilities in the western Pacific
Ocean.62 China’s navy is not as technologically advanced as the U.S. Navy, but
even merely in quantity China’s naval ships constitute an effective war-fighting
force and attest to China’s long-term naval ambitions. The U.S. Navy’s increased
attention to “dispersed lethality” reflects its concern with the modernization,
growing number, and improved quality of China’s naval ships.63
China also is developing airpower to support its oceangoing navy. It is producing military aircraft with greater capabilities and ranges that will provide greater
air support for Chinese surface ships. Its intermediate-range surface-to-surface
ballistic missiles can degrade U.S. access to the naval facilities throughout East
Asia that enable the U.S. Navy to project naval and air power. China also is modernizing its command and control capabilities with improved satellite communications and air-based and underwater reconnaissance and targeting.64
Xi Jinping, Nationalism, and Chinese Naval Ambition
As was the case with French, German, and American naval expansionism,
nationalism is a driver of China’s naval ambitions. Xi Jinping’s “China dream”
platform is a nationalist promise to bring modernization and advancement not
only to the Chinese people but also to the Chinese nation in world affairs.65
Members of the Chinese military, including Chinese naval officers, have argued
that a “strong army dream” and a strong navy are central to achieving the “China
dream.”66 Similarly, Xi’s call for da fuxing Zhongguo (the great rejuvenation of
China) is a direct call for China to restore its status as a great power. In 2017, Xi
assured the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) that “[t]oday, we are closer to the
goal of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation than any other time in history, and we need to build a strong people’s military now more than any other
time in history.” He promised the PLA that “[w]e will never allow any people,
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organization, or political party to split any part of Chinese territory from the
country at any time, in any form.”67
Reinforcing Xi Jinping’s ambitions has been the growth of Chinese mass nationalism. The combination of the spread of the Chinese people’s access to the
World Wide Web in China’s major cities and widespread dissatisfaction with the
alleged weakness of Chinese foreign policy, encouraged by the global financial
crisis and the onset of the U.S. recession, has heightened mass nationalist demands for a more belligerent Chinese foreign policy. Despite China’s authoritarian single-party political system, nationalism can influence Chinese foreign
policy. Leaders who are not sufficiently nationalist/hard-line and responsive to
mass nationalism can be vulnerable to political challenges from their political
adversaries—and in China the cost of political defeat is, at best, lifetime isolation
under house arrest. Equally important, the Chinese Communist Party leadership
is acutely sensitive to the challenge that social instability, including urban nationalist demonstrations, can pose to regime stability and survival.68
In 2009, the number of Internet users in China increased by nearly 60 percent.69 Use of the Internet spread most significantly among the urban population.
Between 2007 and 2010, Internet usage in Beijing increased by 60 percent, penetrating nearly 70 percent of the population; the comparable figures for Shanghai
were 67 percent and 65 percent.70 The expansion of Internet usage has led to strident online nationalist criticism of Chinese foreign policy and has contributed
to widespread nationalist demonstrations against Japan for its arrest of a Chinese
fisherman in 2010 and its government’s “nationalization” of the Diaoyu/Senkaku
Islands in 2012. Belligerent online mass nationalism also contributed to Chinese
government opposition to U.S. naval exercises in the Yellow Sea following North
Korea’s 2010 sinking of a South Korean corvette.71
As Xi Jinping has promoted a nationalist vision of China’s future and as mass
nationalism has spread through Chinese cities, he has led China’s naval activism.
The impact of nationalism and the China dream is especially clear in China’s
costly commitment to developing aircraft carriers, just as nationalism drove
French, German, and U.S. acquisition of large capital ships. Given the proximity
of China’s air and naval bases to its neighbor’s defense facilities in the surrounding seas, including those in Japan, Taiwan, and the South China Sea countries,
China does not require aircraft carriers to project power to contend with regional
competitors, including the United States, to defend its maritime security.
China’s economic growth increasingly relies on its domestic market. Since
2006, as Chinese domestic manufacturing has increased, there has been a steady
and significant decline in Chinese trade dependence, including export dependence.72 China also is only minimally dependent on imports of energy resources
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for its energy security; approximately 90 percent of Chinese energy resources
are sourced domestically or via pipelines transiting countries on China’s interior
periphery. So the country does not require a power-projection navy to defend its
economic interests.73
But aircraft carriers are a symbol of great-power status, so realization of the
China dream required China to develop a fleet of them.74 As Chinese leaders
considered launching China’s first carrier late in the first decade of the twentyfirst century, popular demand for a carrier increased. At public presentations,
Chinese military officers were pressed to explain when China would build a
carrier. Many Chinese citizens offered their own funds to support construction
of an aircraft carrier.75 China’s
[T]he United States did not face a serious
first Soviet-era aircraft carrier,
great-power challenge to its maritime rise
the former Minsk, was a popuin the Western Hemisphere. China’s rise as
lar tourist attraction—33,000
a maritime power faces very different greatvisitors toured the ship in just
power politics.
seven days during the 2006
Chinese New Year holiday.76
Talk shows on China Central Television (CCTV) focused on the merits of an
aircraft carrier; the popularity of the subject led CCTV to air additional programs
on the subject. Among the most popular CCTV television programs at that time
was The Rise of the Great Powers. It stimulated widespread public discussion over
the lessons of history for China’s emergence as a great power. According to the
documentary, all successful great powers have possessed a large blue-water navy,
with large capital ships.77 In 2009, a Chinese foreign affairs weekly reported on
the widespread national conversation focused on “the long-held dream of so
many people” that China would “build its own aircraft carrier.”78 Since then, Xi
has expanded the pace of Chinese carrier production.
China’s recent maritime impatience and boldness reflect Xi’s personal ambition and impatience to resist any challenge to Chinese interests and to restore
China’s great-power status. In the brief span of the fifteen months from late 2012
to early 2013, shortly after he assumed authority over Chinese security policy,
Xi led China to establish routine maritime presence within twelve miles of the
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, thus actively challenging Japanese sovereignty; announce an air-defense identification zone in the East China Sea; occupy the
Philippine-claimed Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea; explore for oil in
disputed waters in the South China Sea for the first time since 1994; challenge
Vietnamese maritime activities in the South China Sea, contributing to heightened tension and a crisis atmosphere in Sino-Vietnamese relations; challenge,
more frequently and more assertively, U.S. air and naval surveillance activities
in the South China Sea; and carry out extensive land-reclamation activities in
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disputed areas of the South China Sea, and subsequently construct air and naval
facilities on its artificial islands.
Accompanying these developments in East Asia is the determined expansion
of the global presence of the PLA Navy (PLAN). Under Xi’s leadership, in 2017
the PLAN carried out its first live-fire exercises in the Mediterranean Sea and its
first joint exercise with the Russian navy, in the Baltic Sea. In 2017, China also
reached agreement with Djibouti for the PLAN to establish its first overseas naval
facility: a logistical support base in East Africa for its operations in the western
Indian Ocean.79
Geopolitics and the Rise of the Chinese Navy
China’s rapidly expanding naval capabilities and its maritime activism attest to its
resolve to challenge U.S. maritime supremacy in East Asia and become a worldclass naval power. As China goes to sea, will its fate resemble the failed nationalist ambitions of France under Louis-Napoléon and of Wilhelmine Germany, or
the successes of the United States when it emerged as a naval power? The fate
of China’s naval ambitions, as was the case with the United States, France, and
Germany, ultimately will depend on the country’s geopolitical circumstances.
In important respects, China’s contemporary geopolitical circumstances
resemble U.S. geopolitical circumstances in the 1890s and the early twentieth
century. In the decades since the end of the Cold War China has established
overwhelming military superiority vis-à-vis its neighbors along its entire periphery. China is bordered by fourteen countries, but none can challenge Chinese
territorial security. After decades of Chinese modernization of its ground-force
capabilities, China’s smaller neighbors, including Vietnam, cannot pose even a
minor challenge to Chinese security. India is a great power in South Asia, but
over the past thirty years the gap between India and rising China has increased
significantly. In contrast to China, India in military affairs remains dependent on
imported platforms for both its navy and its air force. Moreover, the Himalayas
pose a formidable check on India’s ability to threaten Chinese territory, and thus
on the outbreak of a major war on the Sino-Indian border. In economics, recently
India’s annual GDP growth rate has surpassed China’s GDP growth rate. But
because China’s GDP is five times the size of India’s, even should China’s annual
growth in GDP maintain the relatively “slow” rate of 7 percent and India’s maintain 8 percent growth through 2020, China still will add another “three Indias”
to its GDP in that time.80
China’s only neighbor that conceivably might pose a threat to Chinese security is Russia. But since the end of the Cold War, in Northeast Asia Russian
military and economic capabilities have declined dramatically vis-à-vis China’s.
In 1991, there were fourteen million Russians living in the Far East, but in 2010
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the Russian census found that fewer than 6.3 million Russians lived there.81 Infrastructure in the Far East also has suffered since the end of the Cold War. Lack
of Russian investment has contributed to a deterioration of electrical-power
facilities and transportation networks. Russian ports in Northeast Asia have
fallen behind global standards. Overall, the Far East economy is far poorer than
the Russian economy west of the Urals, and at best has stagnated over the past
twenty-five years. Russia has called for China to help with the development of the
Far East economy, contributing to Russian dependence on China.82
Russian military power also has declined. Despite successful Russian groundforce actions in Georgia and Ukraine, much of the Russian military remains
backward and poorly trained. For much of the post–Cold War period the Russian
navy was in decline. Although in recent years it has received increased funding,
its shipbuilding has focused on frigates and cruisers that lack adequate defenses
and primarily are limited to coastal-defense operations.83 But even this limited
recent expansion of the Russian fleet has been hampered by the poor state of the
Russian shipbuilding industry. Russian observers acknowledge that the navy’s
shipyards are in difficult shape and require significant funding, contributing to
extended delays in delivering new ships. In 2017, of the Russian navy’s twentyfour major surface ships, only three had been constructed since the end of the
Cold War. Overall, the decline in Russia’s defense industry is significant. Only 20
percent of its defense companies can be modernized in an economical way.84 Yet
the Russian defense budget has declined in recent years, reflecting the absence
of reform of the Russian economy, the extended decline in GDP growth, and
Western sanctions following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its intervention
in Ukraine. Budget problems have compelled Russia to delay development of a
next-generation destroyer and aircraft carrier. In 2018, the Russian military budget declined by 20 percent compared with 2017’s.85 According to Russian sources,
in 2017 China’s defense budget was three times that of Russia’s.86
Russia’s military decline has become especially apparent in the Far East. Its
intervention in Ukraine and NATO’s subsequent renewal of ground-force and
naval exercises on Russia’s periphery have compelled Russia to concentrate much
of its limited force capabilities on the growing U.S./NATO challenge to Russian
security, thus weakening further the Russian strategic presence in the Far East.87
China, on the other hand, has developed advanced ground-force and naval
technologies and platforms that contribute to the growth of its full-spectrum
conventional superiority over the Russian military in Northeast Asia. Moreover,
just south of the Sino-Russian border China enjoys the benefits of plentiful arable
land and rapid industrial growth. In its northeast, China has developed a modern economy, an increasingly well-educated and capable population, advanced
and well-trained ground-force capabilities, and a sophisticated high-technology
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infrastructure. Moscow cannot patrol its borders, so the Sino-Russian border can
be as porous to Chinese migration and trade as it was for most of the nineteenth
century and the early twentieth century, when 80 percent of the civilians in Vladivostok were Chinese or Korean.88 In the twenty-first century, China’s stronger
commercial presence in the Far East challenges the economic integration of the
Far East with the rest of Russia.89 China’s domination of the Sino-Russian border
has increased since the end of the Cold War.
Overall, the gap between Chinese and Russian underlying economic greatpower capabilities has widened in the twenty-first century. The significant difference between Chinese and Russian GDP growth rates over the past twentyfive years has contributed to the widening of the Sino-Russian economic and
technological gaps. Moreover, Russia has yet to reform its economy; it has been
content to rely on oil revenues to sustain economic growth. The prospects for
relative improvement in Russia’s economic situation have not improved. More
recently, the new international sources of gas and oil and the resulting drop in
world energy prices, combined with NATO’s economic retaliation against Russia
for its intervention in Ukraine, contributed to the onset of a Russian recession.
This recession, or stagnation, is likely to endure for many years, thus postponing
further Russia’s ability to develop sustained economic growth and to field a strong
military in the Russian Far East.90 Russian defense spending as a share of GDP is
already more than double Chinese defense spending as a share of GDP.91 Russia
cannot contend with China in an arms competition.
The decline of Russian capabilities in Northeast Asia diminishes the necessity
for Beijing to allocate significant resources to defend its northern border. Chinese analysts have minimal concern that Russia will reemerge as an East Asian
great power that can challenge Chinese security.92 Thus, in terms of the domestic
security of the great power, the Sino-Russian border increasingly resembles the
U.S.-Canadian border.
Therefore, along its entire mainland periphery China’s strategic circumstances
resemble U.S. strategic circumstances in the late nineteenth century and early
twentieth century, when American nationalism promoted the development of the
United States as a global naval power, rather than the geopolitical circumstances
that contributed to the demise of French and German nationalist naval ambitions. Consolidated Chinese border security has allowed China to allocate an increasing share of its growing defense budget to developing a large, modern naval
force, thus enabling the development of great-power capabilities that can challenge U.S. maritime hegemony.93 The PLA’s 2015 defense white paper on China’s
military strategy reported that China’s “traditional mentality that land outweighs
sea must be abandoned, and great importance has to be attached to managing the
seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests.” Thus, China’s navy
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“will gradually shift its focus from ‘offshore waters defense’ to the combination of
‘offshore-waters defense’ with ‘open-seas protection.’”94 Insofar as China’s defense
budget consumes a mere 2 percent of its GDP, China can expand its naval budget
significantly with minimal repercussions for the Chinese economy.95
The Rise of the Chinese Navy and U.S.-Chinese Competition
Thus, in many respects, China’s geopolitical circumstances resemble the American geopolitical circumstances that facilitated the U.S. effort to dominate the
Caribbean Sea and ultimately the Western Hemisphere. China possesses the continental security and the growing economy that will enable it to fund a large and
modern naval force without undermining Chinese continental border security.
But in one important respect China’s geopolitical circumstances are different
from those of the United States at the turn of the twentieth century. The United
States peacefully rose to be a great naval power and to exert hemispheric hegemony because the established global powers faced more-pressing issues in their
home theater. Between 1895 and 1905, both Britain and Germany ceded the Caribbean Sea to U.S. naval hegemony because they faced threats to their territorial
integrity from other European powers, so they could not afford conflict in distant
regions. Britain, the established global power, withdrew its fleet to European
waters, and Germany, the rising global power, never thought to challenge the
United States in the Caribbean Sea. Thus, in effect, the United States did not face
a serious great-power challenge to its maritime rise in the Western Hemisphere.
China’s rise as a maritime power faces very different great-power politics. The
United States, the established maritime power in East Asia, does not face a challenge in the Western Hemisphere to either its continental or maritime security.
Similarly, European countries are not dependent on a major U.S. presence in
Europe to contend with Russian military power. U.S. security interests outside
East Asia thus do not require the United States to concede Chinese maritime hegemony in East Asia. On the contrary, China’s maritime rise in East Asia already
has encountered significant U.S. resistance. The U.S. “pivot to Asia” during the
Barack Obama presidency, including the strengthening of the U.S. naval presence in East Asia, reflected U.S. concern about rising Chinese naval power and
the American intention to balance the rise of China and strengthen U.S.–East
Asian alliances. Similarly, during the Donald Trump administration, U.S. defense
policy has focused on expanding the size of the U.S. Navy to contend with China’s
expanding fleet. U.S. development of advanced-technology weapons reflects
the country’s growing concern for the maritime balance of power in East Asia.
U.S. researches on laser weapons, the rail gun, carrier-based attack and reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles, underwater antisubmarine and antimine
drones, long-range antiship cruise missiles, range extensions for U.S. carrierbased aircraft, and ship-based antiship cruise missiles all reflect the U.S. effort to
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contend with the rise of China’s navy. Similarly, heightened U.S. resistance since
2013 to China’s legal claims and its land-reclamation activities in the South China
Sea reflects U.S. efforts to bolster its regional strategic partnerships as China has
developed greater naval power.
Thus, despite similar continental geopolitical circumstances, the greatpower consequences of the rise of China in East Asia may be very different from
the great-power consequences of the rise of the United States in the Western
Hemisphere. America’s peaceful rise reflected the strategic priorities that the
established great powers, especially Great Britain, faced in distant regions. As
China rises, it will not enjoy such fortunate geopolitical circumstances. Rather,
America’s strategic priority will be balancing the rise of China in East Asia. This
suggests that the rise of China in the twenty-first century may elicit far greater
instability and great-power competition and tension, including crises and arms
races, than the instability and tension elicited by the rise of the United States at
the turn of the twentieth century.
This historical comparative analysis of case studies of great-power maritime expansionism suggests that naval nationalism, not realist strategic considerations or
an unrelenting drive for security or immediate national security interests, drives
costly revisionist impulses and strategically counterproductive naval acquisitions
that distract from realist policy making and frequently contribute to significant
strategic setbacks. Such nationalist dynamics explain not only the costly failures
of the French and German maritime ambitions discussed in this article but also
the failed ambitions of France in the early nineteenth century during the Napoleonic Wars, Russian maritime ambitions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, Japan’s maritime ambitions in the 1930s, and the Soviet Union’s maritime ambitions in the 1970s and 1980s.96
In the twentieth century, the United States was the exception to this historical pattern. Nationalism drove its naval expansionism, but its successful rise as a
global maritime power reflected the benefits neither of nationalism nor of realist, threat-based strategic planning. Instead, U.S. success as a rising naval power
occurred despite the potentially detrimental effects of American nationalism.
Given America’s single-minded expansionist ambitions and its ambitious naval
acquisition program during the Roosevelt administration, fortuitous strategic
circumstances best explain America’s early maritime successes.
In the twenty-first century, China is the rising power that is challenging the
great-power status quo. To a significant degree, its naval ambitions and its revisionist strategic impatience are driven by the convergence of growing mass
nationalism and nationalist leadership. Nonetheless, unlike France and Germany,
China possesses the necessary geopolitical circumstances that allowed the United
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States to become a maritime great power. It does not face a significant continental
threat to its security. But unlike the United States, China likely will face resistance
to a revised regional security order from the established maritime power, the
United States. Thus, China’s fortuitous geopolitical circumstances and the likelihood of continued economic growth, even at lower annual rates, probably will
enable it to challenge U.S. maritime hegemony, but in doing so it will contribute
to heightened great-power conflict, with implications for the global security order and the prospects of great-power war instead of peace.
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